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The present study aims to create a new model of port safety management in our country based on the 
analysis and assessment of the risk with the Formal Safety Assessment methodology to make it a first 
level instrument in the planning of the safety management of Port safety and also maritime port 
emergencies.
 
1. Introduction 
 
This study aims to generate a new model management 
port safety in our country, based on risk treatment: risk 
analysis, risk assessment and risk management. Safety is 
always a risk option. The methodology applied is the 
Formal Safety Assessment, in relation to port risks, both 
in relation to maritime safety and marine security. The 
model also allows a better planning of response systems 
in the face of port emergencies. 
 
2. The Formal Safety Assessment 
 
Originally developed in response to the Piper Alpha 
disaster in 1988 (an oil rig that exploded in the North Sea 
killing 167 people), from the Lord Carver Report, 
submitted to the British Parliament, the MCA proposed to 
the IMO a more scientific approach to the investigation of 
maritime accidents. It also began a proactive approach in 
the management of maritime safety, which since the 
Titanic in 1912 was in a reactive phase: after the incident 
a new regulation is generated. The right followed the fact. 
 
The IMO describes the FSA (Formal Safety Assessment) 
as a structured and systematic methodology, with the aim 
of strengthening maritime safety, including the protection 
of human life, health, the marine environment and 
property, through the use of risk analysis and the 
evaluation of the cost of its benefits. In addition, the FSA 
is used as an instrument to evaluate the new regulations 
on maritime safety and the protection of the marine 
environment or in the comparison between existing rules 
and possible improved rules. All this with the aim of 
obtaining a balance between technical and operational 
issues, which include the human factor, maritime safety 
and the protection of the marine environment. 
According to the IMO Guide (MSC Circular 1023): Risk 
is the combination of frequency with the severity of the 
consequence. 
 
Risk Analysis is the systematic use of information 
available to identify hazards and estimate risk to people, 
property or the environment. 
 
Figure 1: Steps in the FSA process 
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Source: IMO, MSC Circ. 1023 
 
The FSA has been described by IMO as "a rational and 
systematic process to assess the risks associated with 
maritime activity and to evaluate the costs and benefits of 
IMO options on reducing such risks". 
 
The FSA emerges as a different instrument to fight 
against the production of marine accidents. It is not about 
correcting the causes of a particular disaster, which on the 
other hand is practically impossible to be repeated. But it 
is to avoid that these causes may be produced before the 
accident can happen. It also allows a rational and 
transparent evaluation in the process of creating new 
maritime safety rules and regulations, specifically 
including an assessment of the cost and/or potential 
benefits of the new regulations. The FSA takes express 
reason of the risks and its analysis in the management of 
the safety, also it takes advantage of the information 
derived from the accidents. 
 
 
Risk Assessment is to review the risk acceptability that 
has been analysed and evaluated, based on the 
comparison with the standards or criteria that define risk 
tolerability. 
 
Risk Management is the application of the evaluation 
with the intention of informing the decision-making 
process with the appropriate risk reduction measures and 
their possible implementation. 
  
In the Anglo-Saxon literature the following expressions 
are used: HAZID (Hazard identification) for the study 
and identification of risks and hazards and HAZOP 
(Hazard operability), for the Operational Functional 
Analysis (OFA) this last technique is more focused on the 
operational aspects and the check of systems. 
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Table 1: Conceptual explanation of the FSA process 
 
 
FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
 
Current approach 
 
Phase 1 
 
 
Identification of risks 
 
What could go wrong? 
 
What went wrong? 
 
Phase 2 
Analysis of risks, frequencies, 
possibilities and consequences 
Which frequency? 
Which probability? 
Which magnitude? 
 
 
Phase 3 
Identification of the options of 
control of the risk 
How can things be done 
in a better way? 
What should have 
been done to improve 
the situation? 
 
Phase 4 
 
Evaluation of the cost of the 
benefits 
How much is it? 
How much is 
improved? 
 
 
 
Phase 5 
 
 
Recommendations 
Which actions are 
worth starting? 
Which actions must 
be taken? 
 
Source: JR de Larrucea 2015, on “Maritime Safety” p. 262 (Translation), (ISBN: 9788416171002) 
  
The application of the FSA is divided into five phases. The following diagram shows the 5 
phases of the FSA
2
:  
 
Figure 2: Phases of the FSA process 
                                                
2 A full discussion of the process can be seen in the publication of the Kontovas K. Doctoral Thesis in 
Critical Review and Future Role"
(http://www.martrans.org/cvkontovas2.htm
 
 
 
"Formal Safety Assessment: 
. Systematic work on the IMO Guidelines, 
); Laboratory for Maritime Transport (2005); National Technical University of Athens.
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Available from: 
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Source: Óp. Cit. JR de Larrucea 2015, on “Maritime Safety” p. 261 (Translation) , (ISBN: 9788416171002)
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The ALARP (As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable) Principle. For a risk to be 
considered ALARP it must be possible to 
demonstrate that the cost of continuing to 
reduce that risk is disproportionate 
compared to the benefit that would be 
obtained. That is, the risks should be 
avoided unless the difference between the 
cost and the benefit obtained is 
disproportionate. This equilibrium point has 
been incorporated into the FSA 
methodology, in its phase 4: cost-benefit 
assessment. 
 
The FSA, in spite of its great formalism and 
being a complex process, enjoys great 
relevance and popularity, practically all 
maritime universities and research centres 
worldwide undertake or have undertaken 
/FSA studies. However, the FSA is not a 
"magic" instrument: it does not solve all the 
problems and does not answer all the 
questions. Within the MSC 79 the analogy 
with radar raised: it was thought that behind 
the radar the collisions would disappear. It 
should be borne in mind that when used 
correctly, it is a good instrument for 
comparing possible options
3
, for a rational 
and transparent debate in the creation of 
standards and in the legislative debate and, 
of course, it provides a criterion of 
proportionality in safety management. An 
extremely interesting aspect is its influence 
on the design and construction of ships 
based on the identification of hazards and 
risks by vessel type (HAZID), an aspect 
that has revolutionized naval engineering
4
. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 For example, thanks to the FSA, the IMO decided not to 
consider the need for a helicopter landing strip on passenger 
ships (SOLAS Chapter III, Article 28.1). In the same sense 
the proposal on the double hull for the bulkarriers. The FSA 
has been projected including air transport (SAM - Safety 
Assessment Methodology of EUROCONTROL). See of the 
author of this paper: Maritime safety. General theory of risk 
(2015); p. 259 et seq. 
 
4 Based on the work of SAFEDOR 
(http://www.safedor.org/), a research consortium created by 
the Shipyards and Classes within the framework of the 6th 
Framework Program of the EU. The essential reference 
work; see for all: Papanikolau A. in Risk-Based Ship Design 
Methods, Tools and Applications; Ed. Springer 2009. 
 
 
3. Port Maritime Safety Management: 
the relationship between risk analysis 
and risk management 
 
3.1. Background: The Port Marine Safety 
Code and the Safety Management 
System (SMS) 
 
In the international area, the Port Marine 
Safety Code (PMSC) is a valuable 
precedent in its current version of 2016
5
, 
based on the legal basis of the Pilotage Act 
1987 modified in 1998 after the accident of 
the Sea Empress. The Code appears 
associated with a Guide of Good Practice 
for all members of the port community
6
. 
 
The Port Maritime Safety Code (PMSC) 
requires that all ports base their 
management of maritime operations (i.e. 
policies, plans and procedures) on a formal 
assessment of the dangers and risks for port 
navigation. In addition, port authorities 
must maintain a Safety Management System 
(SMS) developed from this risk assessment. 
It is important, therefore, that when certain 
maritime operations are carried out, such as 
special trailers, vessel movements or new 
operations, which are beyond the scope of 
the SMS, these operations are evaluated to 
determine the probable risk for the safety of 
navigation. Likewise, for each organization, 
the figure of the Designated Person who is 
considered the person who must ensure the 
objective adaptation between the SMS and 
the PMSC, perform audits, risk analysis, 
lessons learned, etc. 
 
Also establish what additional or new risk 
control measures are required to reduce that 
risk to an acceptable level. The Harbour 
Master will advise the operators if any 
operation or trade belongs to that category. 
The result of this specific risk assessment 
can then be perfectly interconnected with 
the broader port SMS. 
                                                 
5 Available from its current edition at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/port-marine-
safety-code; from the HSE social work perspective see: 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/indg446.pdf 
 
6Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att
achment_data/file/590160/guide-good-practice-marine-
code.pdf 
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The relationship between risk analysis and 
risk management is explained by the fact 
that the risk analysis defines the risks, while 
the Safety Management System manages 
the risks. These are two phases that 
constitute different autonomous processes 
but that have an authentically symbiotic 
relationship; The two processes are only 
fully effective when used together. 
 
Figure 3: Relationship between safety management system 
and risk assessment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Port of London Authority PLA 
 
 
3.1 The IHMA (International Harbour 
Master Association) and the figure and 
functions of the Harbourmaster in the 
management of maritime port safety 
 
An extremely valuable reference from 
practice and professional experience is the 
position of the IHMA (International 
Harbour Master Association)
7
 that 
highlights the role of the Harbour Master as 
a key figure in the development and 
implementation of a management system 
for the safety that manages the hazards and 
risks associated with port operations along 
with any emergency preparedness. This 
system must be operated efficiently and 
reviewed and evaluated periodically. The 
aforementioned association uses the FSA as 
a method of risk analysis not only in safety 
management, but also in emergencies.  
 
                                                 
7 See: http://www.harbourmaster.org/hm-port-safety.php 
The main function of the Harbour Master is 
the safety of all maritime operations. To 
achieve a safe harbour, you must consider 
what can go wrong and the best way to 
prevent it. This is the underlying principle 
of risk assessment, a practice that will not 
only lead to a safer port but will also help 
reduce insurance premiums, quality and 
costs and other commercial benefits for the 
port community. Good risk assessments can 
be used not only in the formulation of better 
operational procedures, but also in the 
formulation of effective emergency plans. 
 
 
4. The identification of maritime risks 
(HAZID and HAZOP) 
 
The main objective of the SAFEDOR 
European Research Consortium was the 
design of ships according to risk and their 
legal implementation schemes. SAFEDOR 
is an integrated project in the 6th 
Framework Program of the European 
Commission. The project started in 
February 2005 and ended in 2009. Under 
the coordination of the Germanischer Lloyd 
classification society, 53 companies 
(shipyards, consultants, etc.) and 
organizations (Class, Administrations, etc.) 
representing all parties involved in the 
European maritime industry. The Spanish 
partner of reference has been the 
NAVANTIA
8
 shipyards. Initially it was 
decided to focus only on the four most 
representative and most economically 
significant types of ships for Europe: cruise 
ships, RoRo/RoPax, gas carriers and 
container ships. Later oil tankers were also 
included. 
 
 Risk is used as an objective instrument to 
evaluate the effectiveness of design changes 
with respect to safety. The main idea in the 
SAFEDOR project was the Design for 
Safety concept, which describes the 
integration of safety as an objective in the 
design process to minimize risk, along with 
traditional design objectives such as 
minimizing energy requirements and 
maximize the load capacity. 
5. Identification of Port Risks ((HAZID 
and HAZOP) 
                                                 
8 See the official website Available from: www.safedor.org 
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Two bibliographical references appear as 
essential in the material on the analysis and 
treatment of port risks and more particularly 
in the HAZID of these risks: Navigational 
Risk Assessment - Guidance to Operators 
and Owners of the PLA9 and the Port & 
Harbour Risk Assessment and the Guide 
Safety Management Systems in New 
Zealand10. 
 
Examples of Hazard Titles identified in the 
PLA’s navigational Safety Management 
System of London: 
 
Contact - Class V Passenger Vessel with 
Bridges           
Collision - Private Leisure Craft (River) 
Collision - Tanker Berthing (Sea Reach 
Collision - Large Tanker (River) 
Contact - Vessel in Southend Anchorage 
Contact - Tanker at Coryton/Canvey 
Collision - VLCC (Black Deep and Knock 
John) 
Contact - Thames Barrier (Barrier Open) 
Contact - Tanker alongside Vopak 
Fire/Explosion - Any Jetty 
Wash - Passing Traffic 
Contact - Vessel anchored in Gravesend 
Reach 
Contact - Tanker alongside ST Services 
Fire/Explosion - Fire on Class V Passenger 
Vessel 
Collision - Vessel leaving Sea Reach 
Anchorages 
Chemical Tanker (River) 
Contact - Passenger jetty, pier or pontoon. 
Contact - Bridge (Tower to Richmond) 
Contact - Vessel in Leigh/Yantlet 
Anchorage 
Collision - Knob Buoy 
Grounding - Pilot/PEC/Master's Error 
Contact - Small Bulk Carrier & Bridge 
Collision - Bugsby's/Blackwall Reach 
Grounding - Princes Channel (Western 
End) 
Contact - Vessel on Erith Tier/Swing Buoy 
Contact - Jetties, Berths, during river 
passage 
Collision - Bunker Barge 
Collision - Chemical Tanker (Estuary) 
                                                 
9 See: https://www.pla.co.uk/Safety/Navigational-Risk-
Assessment-Guidance-to-Operators-and-Owners 
10 See: https://www.maritimenz.govt.nz/commercial/ports-
and-harbours/documents/Port-harbour-risk-assessment.pdf 
Collision - Small Bulker and Tug/Tow 
Collision - Small Bulker Class V Passenger 
Vessel 
Collision - Erith Rands/Erith Reach 
Grounding - Warp/Oaze Area 
Grounding - Across Dredged Box 
Contact - Greenhithe Swing Buoy/Vessel 
moored nearby 
Collision - Long Reach 
Collision - Yantlet Channel 
Contact - Inside Berths 
Collision - E. Swin Channel (Nr Whitaker 
Buoy) 
Contact - Moorings or vessel on Moorings 
Mooring Breakout - (Tanker) 
Grounding - Knock John Channel 
Grounding - London Bridge to Teddington 
Contact - Groynes off Diver Shoal 
Contact - Tanker alongside Esso Purfleet 
Contact - QEII Bridge 
Contact - Propulsion system immobilized 
Collision - Passenger Ship (River) 
Collision - Product Tanker (River) 
Contact - Oikos (Heavy Landing) 
Contact - Coryton No 4 Upper Dolphin 
(Berthing)Collision - Oaze Deep 
Collision – West Oaze - SR1 
Loss of Hull Integrity - Sinking of Small 
Vessel 
Collision - Lower/Upper Pool 
Collision - Dredger 
Collision - Gravesend Reach 
Grounding - Yantlet Flat, Grain Spit, Nore 
Sand 
Grounding - Vessel with incorrectly 
reported draft 
Collision - London Bridge to Bell Lane 
Creek 
Collision - St. Clement's Reach 
 
 
6. Conclusions: 
 
1st) The vision of safety must be developed 
at the higher level of port management and 
not as a secondary or collateral aspect. Risk 
management plays a fundamental role in the 
safety and protection of the institution, and 
therefore becomes a mission. 
 
2nd) Knowledge of risk management 
reduces risk and helps the development of 
ports and increases their productivity. 
Training for risk management is the process 
of practicing the necessary skills to develop 
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a risk assessment and port safety 
management, and it has become an integral 
part of the port strategy. 
 
3rd) The ports should study and plan 
properly HAZID and HAZOP and 
effectively apply risk management to all 
types of risks. The maritime HAZID can be 
estimated from the existing studies (i.e. 
SAFEDOR UE), however there is a lack of 
SAI studies per port of the local HAZIDs 
and the particular port risks. The 
experiences and models of other countries 
can be of great help. 
 
4th) Lege ferenda would be desirable to 
have a Port Maritime Safety Code which 
suppose that all ports base their 
management of maritime operations (i.e. 
policies, plans and procedures) on a formal 
assessment of the dangers and risks to 
navigation in port. 
 
5th) Whether or not a code is available, port 
authorities must maintain a safety 
management system developed based on 
this risk assessment. 
 
6th) The risk management system must be 
implemented for all Spanish ports in 
agreement with the FSA. After the 
determination and analysis of risks, 
emergency plans must be consistent with 
them and with the risks planned and 
studied. The only approach to risk in our 
port system is in relation to the ISPS 
protection (RD 1617/2007), however he 
SECUREPORT model of vulnerability and 
risk assessment in relation to protection has 
methodological dysfunctions. 
 
7th) The Spanish model of port safety is 
characterized by the dispersion of powers 
and administration and a succession of 
different plans and sub plans, without 
unitary criteria: PPP, PPIP, PAU, PEI, PIM, 
IPP, etc.; with different managers and 
protocols, a critical aspect that reduces 
effectiveness in the treatment of crisis and 
emergencies. For illustrative purposes: the 
deliberate burning of a ship in port would 
activate the Port Protection Plan (illicit 
act); In relation to the fire, the SPP/IEP: 
Self-protection Plan or internal 
emergencies and in relation to the 
contamination of the IMP (Interior 
Maritime Plan) or the IMP of the port 
facility.  
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